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Editorial

In the last issue of DIALOGUE, we wanted to mark DIAL's solidarity with the people of Mali by drawing the attention of the scientific community to the health situation of the country. Since then, the French and Chadian troops have intervened and the security conditions of the country have improved. Although there is still some fighting going on in certain zones of Mali, the international cooperation can gradually resume in this more favourable context, in particular the French cooperation. The activities of the IRD, which were greatly slowed down in the past months, aim to accompany this process. For now, this effort goes through strategic planning for research and training in favour of development, initiated by the IRD's office in Bamako. At DIAL's level, projects in cooperation with the Statistical Institute (INSTAT) should be able to start again thanks to this initiative. INSTAT in fact took advantage of the country's stabilization to launch the second wave of the permanent modular survey (EMOP), a large-scale survey designed to cover the entire territory. The remaining insecurity in the North has however forced INSTAT to exclude the areas of Tombouctou, Gao and Kidal of this survey round. This vast data collection operation is crucial to get a better grasp of the households' living conditions in post-conflict Mali and in particular will be key to establishing a first diagnosis of the consequences of war on the population.

Among other problems, Mali suffers from a deficit of strong state institutions without which the effects of the military intervention could be short lasting. The extent and the nature of the role of institutions in the process of economic development have received a lot of attention from the research community. This topic will be at the centre of the second edition of the conference organized by DIAL, whose theme will be "Institutions and Development". This event will be held on June 27 and 28, 2013 in Paris. It will gather about 120 researchers from all over the world, who will have the opportunity to hear the keynote speakers Jean-Philippe PLATTEAU and Ragnar TORVIK in the plenary sessions that will begin each day.

Among institutions that have an impact on everyday life, those playing a role in the functioning of the labour market are of key importance. When information on available jobs or on the ability of workers to take these jobs does not circulate well, job seekers or entrepreneurs looking for competent labour often have no other choice than to call on their informal social network. This then raises several questions concerning the efficiency of these informal networks. These questions are the topic of this semester's newsletter.

Finally, this editorial seems the right place to advertise the existence of *Terangaveb – l'Afrique des idées*, an independent association that aims at promoting debate and thinking on topics related to Africa. Mostly made up of African doctoral students, young researchers and professionals, the association runs a website, terangaveb.com, with the ambition of making it an Internet portal for both the expert and non-specialist intellectual production on Africa. We wish this young team great success in its endeavour.

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Social networks and jobs in developing countries

A recent economic literature emphasizes the role of social networks in labour markets in conveying information about employment, market opportunities or new technology (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005; Ioannides and Loury, 2004). From a theoretical perspective, social networks are known to be crucial to understand the dynamics of labour market, in particular duration dependence in employment states and persistence in unemployment (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004, 2007; Bramoullé and Saint-Paul, 2010). From an empirical viewpoint, evidence shows that there is a widespread use of friends, relatives, and other acquaintances to search for salaried jobs and to access coveted positions. For self-employed workers, it has been shown that social networks may be used to reduce the uncertainties they face regarding market opportunities, reliance of partners, or productivity of their prospective employees, and also to enhance risk-sharing and informal credit arrangements (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003).

These issues are decisive in developing countries where a large part of inefficiency in the labour market may be due to imperfect information. These countries are often characterized by a lack of formal institutions channeling information about jobs or market opportunities. In Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso for instance, 85 percent of unemployed workers were not registered in the public employment office in 2002, and 45 percent of them declared that this was because they did not know it did exist (DIAL, 2007). In the absence of formal institutions, the role played by interpersonal relationships may then be substantial in employment trajectories. The lack of access to formal sources of credit has first repercussions on employment practices. In Vietnam for instance, the absence of a formal capital market has reinforced the development of the private sector through the proliferation of new small enterprises, rather than through the growth of existing ones (Cling *et al.*, 2010). This resulted in a steady growth of self-employment for middle-aged workers. However, in the absence of external capital, few young people have the resources required to establish their own enterprise and they often have to rely on kinship ties to obtain a job.

Overall, while there is large consensus in the economic literature that social networks provide a range of benefits for individuals by reducing transaction costs, facilitating access to information, helping overcome the dilemmas of collective action, generating learning spinoffs and providing informal insurance, much less is known about the possible adverse

effects of family and kinship ties, in particular for entrepreneurial success.

In this letter, we focus our attention on two channels linking social networks and jobs in developing countries. Looking at recent papers relying on new survey data in West Africa, the first channel examined relates to the dynamics of employment, in particular access to jobs and professional transitions overtime. We then discuss a recent literature linking social networks and small business performance in developing countries (in West Africa, Vietnam, and Madagascar), allowing a particular focus on the gender dimension of entrepreneurship.

1. *Social networks and job dynamics*

There is now a large literature dealing with the broad concept of ‘social network capital’ and its effect on job access and allocation. Looking at the empirics, the main consensus is that using social network capital may be productive in findings jobs. Those who found jobs through personal contacts were generally less likely to quit and had longer tenure in their jobs. Recent studies on network effect discuss the importance of network size, its geographical proximity, the resource endowments of contacts and the nature of the links between contacts to explain differences in the effects of social networks (Maurin and Moschion, 2009; de Marti and Zenou, 2009).

In an African context, Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer (2012) disentangle the determinants of transitions from unemployment to employment and changes in workers' employment status overtime. They notably emphasize the role played by social networks in stabilizing or helping workers enhance their professional situation. A crucial question tackled is to what extent and why different sorts of social networks may lead to different employment trajectories. While there is strong evidence on the importance of social networks for finding, getting and changing jobs in developing countries, little is known in these countries about the specific effect of different dimensions of social networks. Indeed, most of the existing studies, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, focus on the size of social networks, approximated by the number of contacts that an agent maintains with other categories of agents. However, since the seminal sociological work of Granovetter (1973), it is widely acknowledged that the intensity of ties is an essential dimension of social networks. Granovetter brought out ‘the strength of weak ties’ argument highlighting that links with infrequent interactions or with low intimacy, the weak ties, tend to bridge individuals across social

groups of close interpersonal relationships, and are consequently the most informative and the most useful in the labour market. Lin (1990)'s theory of social resources also emphasizes a dimension of social networks that has to be addressed: the resources available in a network, defined by the socio-economic characteristics of the individuals connected through the network. Some studies have attempted to fill this knowledge gap but they remain divided on the effect of social networks resources and ties content on the labour market. Besides, they mostly focus on enterprise outcomes and they do not address the issue of employment dynamics.

To tackle these questions, Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer (2012) avail themselves of an original survey conducted in 2009 in Ouagadougou on a representative sample of 2,000 households.¹ This survey provides data on the socio-demographic characteristics of the households and their members and also on individual events such as work experience and migration history, family trajectories and reproductive histories through an event history survey (also called 'Biographical survey'). In addition, the survey includes detailed information on social networks collected through a name-generating module in the quantitative survey. In particular, the respondents were asked to provide a list of names of those individuals who had helped them in various situations: throughout schooling, in case of extra-expenditures (ceremonies, celebration, health problem of a family member) or in case of difficulties to pay current expenditures, to access their last job or to improve their current professional activity, and to find housing. In addition, the respondents were asked to cite all their siblings from the same mother and father who were currently alive, and all the individuals they had helped during the past 12 months. Further questions about the characteristics of the cited person, as well as relationships between them and between the respondent and each of them, provide information for reconstructing the density of the network, the strength of ties, and for knowing the socioeconomic statuses of those cited and thus the social resources they may provide. These name generators allowed the authors to collect information on 14,696 'alters'.² The 'ego' database contains work histories of 1,762 men and 1,050 women totaling 2,812 individuals. In addition, the authors conducted qualitative interviews with a sub-sample of the workers who responded to the event history survey.

The authors then analyze the effect of social networks on specific employment transitions in Ouaga-

dougou. Do social networks help some unemployed access employment? Are social networks one of the resources needed to improve the workers' employment status? To what extent is personal social network essential in the transition from wage employment to self-employment or from self-employment to wage employment? Indeed, using the divide of self- and wage-employment in urban West Africa has been shown to be a meaningful way of characterizing the quality and vulnerability of jobs (Bocquier, Nordman and Vescovo, 2010). To estimate labour market transitions and changes in the workers' employment status, they rely on a survival analysis that makes use of proportional hazard models for discrete-time data. They find that social networks have a significant effect on the transitions of individuals on the labour market. However, this effect differs depending on the type of transition and on the dimension of the social network considered, i.e. the network size, the resources available in the network, and the strength of ties. The network size only plays a role in the transition from self-employment to wage employment, knowing that this transition is on average the most precarious. In this case, the network size seems to have an informative function, by conveying information throughout the network, but the information provided may be of little value. Network size is far from being the most important dimension of social networks in the transition from unemployment to employment. This is an important finding with regards to the existing literature, which mostly focuses on developed countries and highlights the efficient role of network size in job search. One of the reasons why this contradiction may exist is that the safety net function of the social network could dominate its informative function in a context where there is no formal safety net for unemployed workers.

Regarding the strength of ties, strong ties seem to play a stabilizing role in labour market dynamics. Indeed, having a network endowed in strong ties, in particular kinship ties, increases the probability to remain in the same status of activity for self-employed and unemployed workers. Strong ties seem to be of little use for access to wage employment. During the job search, unemployed workers having strong ties in their networks may tend to limit their effort to find a job. These results suggest that the safety net function of strong ties also dominates their informative function. By contrast, weak ties are useful for self-employed workers to get a better access to information on wage employment opportunities or to be recommended, but without any guarantee with regard to job quality. Strong ties facilitate transitions in only one case, the transition from wage employment to self-employment. They play an important role for self-employed workers at every stage of their career, in particular at the start-

1 This survey was conducted by a team of IRD researchers (Boyer and Delaunay, 2009) including the authors.

2 In this paper, what is called 'personal' or 'egocentered' network is thus composed of a focal individual, named 'Ego', a set of Ego's direct social contacts, named 'alters' and the ties between them.

up of a business but also later on. Strong ties may help self-employed workers face uncertainty or invest in a small business, but as they go hand in hand with homophily, they do not seem to help get away from a precarious status in the labour market. In the same way, resources embedded in the network are a factor of occupational immobility: they have a negative effect on occupational transitions of Burkinabe workers and this effect is reinforced when resources are combined with strong ties. The higher the network resources, the more profitable it is to evolve within the self-employment or wage employment statuses, and the weaker the incentive to find a job.

Finally, what the study of Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer (2012) actually points out is that social networks have to be addressed taking into account their three explored dimensions and interactions. If not, the effect of social networks on labour market dynamics and outcomes may well be misunderstood, in particular if network size is solely considered. This paper advocates the development of theoretical approaches that would take into account the coexistence of both the informative and safety net functions of social networks, which is particularly essential in a developing country context. Another promising research agenda would be to deepen the understanding of social networks as factors of social immobility. However, data scarcity on the formation and development of social networks in developing countries is a concern as, ideally, what one would like to observe is the dynamics of personal networks across generations.

An ongoing research using data on Senegalese migrants residing in France, Italy, Mauritania and Côte d'Ivoire investigates similar issues (Gubert, Navarra and Toma, work in progress). Migrants' networks have been found to provide shelter and assistance to newcomers but their role in the labour market remains under-studied. What is unclear in particular is the extent to which different ties have differentiated effects on migrants' labor market performances both upon arrival and after several years in the destination country. Preliminary findings suggest that social ties play a role in job search method.

Strong effects of ethnicity and religion are also found on the quality of both job upon arrival and current job. In contrast, the effect of self-declared connections and of network use is not significant.

2. Social networks and entrepreneurship

On the bright side of social networks...

In many developing countries, the general lack of incentives and support policies towards the domestic private sector has been pointed out. In this context, left to their own devices, with poor institutional support to enter the labour market or to improve their production conditions, small entrepreneurs

often have to rely on social networks in order to access physical capital, information on market opportunities, innovation, suppliers and clients. In the economic literature, it is then widely recognised that performance of micro and small enterprises (MSE), especially household businesses in the informal sector, greatly depends on the presence of an efficient social network surrounding the business owner.

Social networks may reduce transaction costs in business relationships, as informal sanctions may be used to punish uncooperative behaviours, and thus encourage cooperative behaviours. In Vietnam for example, Turner (2009) shows how traders of the ancient quarters of Hanoi have managed to remain in place and to offset adverse trends caused by many upheavals (during the war and socialist periods, as well as the impact of trade liberalization). Turner and Nguyen (2005) illustrate the operation of strong social network capital amongst immediate family and friends to help with the establishment and expansion of an enterprise. Digregorio (2006) and Fanchette and Stedman (2009) shed light on the dynamics of craft villages in the suburbs of Hanoi which are organised in clusters specialised in one activity based on the guarantees of long-term and ongoing relationships.

Social networks may also promote innovation as better connected entrepreneurs will be able to speedily react to new market circumstances, and have better and more creative ideas. They may then increase the intensity and returns to production factors. With data on Ghanaian enterprises, Barr (2002) supports the assumption that entrepreneurs with larger enterprises tend to maintain innovation networks that are large, diverse, less cohesive and best suited to providing access to information about technology and markets. By contrast, entrepreneurs with smaller enterprises tend to maintain solidarity networks that are small, homogeneous, cohesive and best suited to reducing information asymmetries and thus supporting informal credit and risk-sharing arrangements. Using an original dataset collected in the informal economy of Bobo-Dioulasso (Burkina Faso), Berrou and Combarous (2012) find that small informal enterprises are not systematically characterized by small and homogenous networks, and that informal entrepreneurs have to combine strong and wide ongoing social support ties with weaker business ties to be successful. They find positive effects of these ties on value added and earnings, and emphasize the role of kinship ties for start-up resources. Finally, using survey data for seven economic capitals of West Africa, which are drawn from the *1-2-3 Surveys*, and focusing on internal migrants, Grimm *et al.* (2013) found some evidence that family and kinship ties within the city rather enhance labour effort and the use of physical

capital, maybe because local networks help overcome labour market imperfections.

Hence, networks affect enterprise performance in different ways depending on the networks' and the firms' features. A question is then to determine which features of the networks and those of firms interact the most, and through which channel.

Using two rounds of the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS), Nguyen and Nordman (2013) match two samples of Non-Farm Household Businesses (NFHBs) across the years 2004-2006, allowing for a large panel of more than 1,200 formal and informal NFHBs.³ The authors then have a systematic look at the existence of heterogeneous effects of social networks depending on whether the household business operates in the formal or in the informal economy. One may think that social networks are more critical in the informal economy as there is a lack of formal institutions and/or mechanisms supporting access to business inputs and other necessary resources, such as physical and human capital, but also productive infrastructure. The authors investigate the social network determinants of technical efficiency, that is, whether social networks affect the entrepreneurs' ability to reach their production frontier, by combining their inputs in the best possible way. They find that local networks, under the form of close ethnic ties, have positive effects, perhaps thanks to mutual support from the own community and knowledge spillovers. The authors also reveal the importance of unlocking financial constraints (on access to capital) and improving access to professional support for successful household entrepreneurship, for instance through eased access to micro-credits and business association. They finally confirm that social network capital is more critical in the informal economy where it may play a role of substitute of the scarce formal support mechanisms in access to and management of factor inputs.

...and the dark side of family and kinship ties

Other studies conducted by sociologists and anthropologists emphasize the adverse side of social networks. In her research on informal manufacturers in Nigeria, Meagher (2006) identifies disinclination among entrepreneurs to trade with people from their home communities because the latter exert moral pressure to obtain credit and then expect the trader to understand their problems when the time comes for repayment. Whitehouse (2011) also relates such a phenomenon in Bamako, as a taxi driver "would not

accept a fare to his home neighborhood in that city, because he knew once he arrived there he was likely to be spotted by some relative who would insist on being driven somewhere for free."

"An individual who lives in a society where he or she is expected to share his or her income with other family members, sometimes even with such relatively distant family members as first or second cousins, may rationally expect to have to transfer so much of her income—if she is more successful than the others in the family—that the motive for making the effort in the first place is diluted." Alger and Weibull (2008, p. 180).

The idea that family and kinship ties may also imply adverse incentive effects is in fact relatively old. It is quite often mentioned in the anthropological literature, was emphasized by modernization theorists, and was developed in the field of economic sociology and social network analysis as the downside of strong ties, which are also often referred to as 'bonding ties'. More recently, this question has been taken up by a few economists (see e.g. Platteau, 2000; Hoff and Sen, 2006; Luke and Munshi, 2006). These authors argue that family and kinship ties may become an important obstacle in the process of firm development. Members of the kin system that achieve economic success may be confronted with sharing obligations by less successful fellows. This may imply to remit money, to find urban jobs or to host them in the city home. The hypothesis is then that the need to meet such demands can adversely affect the incentives of kin members to pursue and develop their economic activity in the modern sector. Opting out of such kin systems and refusing to comply with these obligations may be possible but may result in strong sanctions and high psychological costs and the kin group may want to prevent this *ex ante* by manipulating the relevant exit-barriers, as in Hoff and Sen (2006)'s model.

There are few empirical studies that specifically address the potential adverse effects of family and kinship ties on entrepreneurial activities. Duflo *et al.* (2009) show that impatient Kenyan farmers forgo highly profitable investments in fertilizer, arguing that the impatience is partly rooted in the difficulty of protecting savings from consumption demands. In South Africa, Di Falco and Bulte (2011) find evidence that kinship size is associated with higher budget shares for non-sharable goods. Baland, Guirkingier and Mali (2011) analyze borrowing behaviour in Cameroon and observe that some people take up credits even without liquidity constraint – just to signal to their kin that they are unable to provide financial assistance. Using a sample of informal entrepreneurs in Burkina Faso, Berrou and Combarous (2012) state that family and kinship ties represent only a quarter of all ties entrepreneurs rely on. They find that more educated entrepreneurs rely

³ The construction of the panel of household businesses follows the method applied in Nguyen, Nordman and Roubaud (2013) where they construct a three-year panel dataset at both household and individual levels.

on weaker ties, suggesting their capacity to extract themselves from existing community constraints. Relying on the *1-2-3 Surveys* for West Africa and focusing on internal migrants, Grimm *et al.* (2013) also provide evidence that the stronger the ties to the birth place of the migrants, measured by the distance to the origin village, the lower input use, a result supporting a forced redistribution hypothesis. Finally, Grimm, Hartwig and Lay (2013) present a theoretical model on the trade-off between sharing and investment which they test on data from tailors in Burkina Faso. Their empirical results support the idea that there are two behavioural patterns: entrepreneurs following an ‘insurance regime’ comply with sharing norms, are insured but reduce investment in their firm, whereas entrepreneurs in a ‘growth regime’ are not insured but take undistorted investment decisions. The choice of regime depends on the redistributive pressure, the willingness to take risk, and the return to investment.

The use of family labour

Micro and small enterprises around the world employ members of the extended family – paid or unpaid. In addition to the lack of labour market intermediaries able to channel information about jobs, this may happen because entrepreneurs think that family labour is more reliable and offers flexibility that is difficult to find on the labour market. Family labour may also exist because the extended family simply expects jobs in small or household firms, either because egalitarian norms require it, or because the extended family helped set up the business and wants to be rewarded for that effort once the company is running.

The literature which examined specifically the effect of employing family workers on entrepreneurial success is rather scarce, particularly in developing countries where family labour is yet more widespread. Some papers investigate the nature and effect of family versus hired labour in firm performance. However, this literature relates essentially to farm businesses, rarely to non-farm small businesses. *A priori*, one might expect family and hired labour to play differently on business performance, because they may have different compositions of male and female, adult versus child, and skilled versus unskilled labour. In developing countries, females and children constitute a larger proportion of family than of hired labour. This would tend to drive down the marginal product of family relative to hired labour if the marginal productivity of women and children is lower than that of adult males. Besides, the skill differential between family and hired labour may also be an important source of heterogeneity in the productivity of workers. For agricultural traders in Madagascar, Fafchamps and Minten (2002) suggest that family members work less hard than hired

workers, which could be explained by a familial pressure to distribute jobs that leads to a number of workers uncorrelated with the necessary amount of work to produce.

But other theoretical arguments can be put forward, sometimes contradicting the common assumption that hired labour is necessarily more productive than family labour. Moral hazard and their associated monitoring costs are hence mechanisms enlightening plausible greater productivity of family versus hired labour. Johnston and Leroux (2007) report that, for farmers, family labour can be more efficient than hired labour as it is assumed to be better incentivised and so will not shirk. The reason for superior incentives is that family labour will share the income generated by the farm as they may be ‘residual claimants to profits’. Consequently, there will be shared incentives between entrepreneurs and workers (other household members) and so little need for additional supervision. The composition of tasks performed by both types of labour may also be considered. Since family workers may perform management and supervisory duties (particularly the household head), their work may have larger effects on output than that of hired workers, who may only perform manual tasks. The performance of managerial and supervisory tasks by family members might then reduce the substitutability between family and hired labour, an assumption that is tested and confirmed by Nguyen and Nordman (2013) with Vietnamese data and by Nordman and Vaillant (2013) in the case of female entrepreneurs in Madagascar. All this would explain why it is not clear whether, with family labour, the entrepreneur faces disadvantages, linked to the lower productivity of family labor, or supervision advantages, arising from the fact that family labour would share the benefits of the work. Using a panel of non-farm household businesses in Vietnam, Nguyen and Nordman (2013) observe that the use and productivity of family labour greatly depend on the circumstances under which the business operates, that is whether it is in the formal or in the informal economy. They notably find that the productivity gap between family and hired labour is particularly large in informal businesses. By contrast, family labour rather reduces technical efficiency in the case of formal businesses.

Sharing norms, gender roles and entrepreneurship

In Madagascar, the prevailing solidarity system is called *fibavanana*. This word captures many dimensions: it suggests a moral obligation to consider others as relatives, translates into benevolent gestures, fraternity, mutual respect, cordiality, search of consensus, solidarity and sharing, in particular in times of troubles. An essential part of the *fibavanana* is the *famangiana*, or solidarity calls, to comfort or con-

gratulate in case of happy (weddings, births) or unhappy events (deaths), and often include a monetary gift (Randrianja and Ellis, 2009; Razafindratsima, 2005; Wachsberger, 2009). Given the central role of the *fibavanana* in the Malagasy culture, studying the impact of sharing and solidarity norms in Madagascar seems particularly relevant.

Many recent studies suggest that female-owned enterprises grow more slowly and exhibit lower profit and productivity levels than male-owned ones (Aterido and Hallward-Driemeier, 2011; Bardasi *et al.*, 2011; De Mel *et al.*, 2009; Mead and Liedholm, 1998; Nichter and Goldmark, 2009). Nordman and Vaillant (2013) investigate the role that social networks may play in this performance gap between female and male-owned informal businesses in Antananarivo. They use the *1-2-3 Surveys* data collected among representative, repeated cross-sections of 4000 informal entrepreneurs in Antananarivo collected between 1995 and 2004. Several characteristics of female entrepreneurs suggest potential gender-differentiated effects of social networks on business performance.

Firstly, female and male migrants differ with respect to their migration decision. Almost half of male migrations were motivated by the prospect of finding a job in the city, while female migrations are mainly motivated by following or joining one's family. Expectations from the family in the location of origin could then be lower as the migrant did not relocate to increase her earnings. In addition, female migrant entrepreneurs move on average further away than their male counterparts, suggesting a possible desire to emancipate themselves from the prevailing gender norms by severing their kinship ties. Women who wish to free themselves from traditional norms and values may also be less likely to conform to other types of cultural norms, such as sharing with the family or the kin group.

Second, the proportion of women in the sample operating their business at home is twice as high as that of men. Home-based activities carry several disadvantages, such as being far from input markets and clients (Ypeij, 2000). It also makes the firm resources visible and available to other members of the household and the kinship network, who may call on these resources if needed (Mead and Liedholm, 1998; Grasmuck and Espinal, 2000). Members of her community, neighbours or friends could take advantage of a social call to the home of the entrepreneur, where the activity is being operated, to ask the owner for favors or help. In an outside location, such as a market, pressures are made more difficult to exert because demands would have to be made in public rather than in the privacy of a home. Such social commitments may also simply distract

the producer from his/her activity, causing the productive activity to be less efficient.

Finally, gender norms may make it difficult for women to hire and supervise male workers, in which case access to family labour can be essential for female entrepreneurs (Kevane and Wydick, 2001). Women could also be more subject than men to pressure to hire family workers, as suggested by the data used in Nordman and Vaillant (2013), which show that the intensity of local kinship ties is positively associated with the use of family labour in female-owned informal businesses only. In both cases, female entrepreneurs may be more constrained than men in the use of a certain type of labour. Male entrepreneurs may have more liberty to choose the type of labour they want to hire and have more access to unpaid family labour when they need it, because they have more bargaining power within the household (Grasmuck and Espinal, 2000).

Overall, there are reasons to think that social networks and their impact on entrepreneurship may be gender-specific. In a randomized control trial, Fafchamps *et al.* (2011) find for female entrepreneurs in Ghana a lower impact of cash transfers on profits compared to in-kind transfers as cash transfers seem to end up going to household expenses and transfers. However, the authors conclude that this is more driven by a lack of self-control than external pressure. Nordman and Vaillant (2013) study whether sharing norms and the pressure to redistribute differently affect the ability of female and male entrepreneurs to reach their production frontier, that is, to use and combine their inputs in the best possible way. Their analysis suggests that only male entrepreneurs are subject to pressure to redistribute from the distant network, which could be due to the abovementioned differences in the type of migration of female and male migrants. For women, having the business located at home is not a handicap *per se*, but it acts as a vector of transmission of negative externalities due to intense social norms on the business management.

Knowledge on the role played by social networks in the labour market and the underlying mechanisms has improved dramatically in recent years. Promising research avenues have been opened, including investigating further the channels of the adverse effects of family and kinship ties, their gender-specific effects, as well as the interaction of the multiple dimensions of social networks.

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Secteur informel, emploi pour les travailleurs ruraux, et processus d'intégration économique : le cas du Delta du Fleuve Rouge (Vietnam)

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Imbricated dynamics in times of fragile growth: individuals, families and household businesses in Madagascar (1995 - 2005).

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