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D I A L
Développement Institutions & Mondialisation

As growing numbers of people in many European Union (EU) countries start to doubt the benefits of post-WWII economic integration, Anda David and Mohamed Ali Marouani's article after this editorial comes as a timely reminder that, for many non-EU countries, the European experience remains a model of regional integration. Yet the fact of the matter is that, although the effects of integration are indubitably positive in theory on the basis that the free movement of capital and persons makes for a more efficient use of resources, very few statistical studies have established that EU membership really does bring the expected benefits. This paradoxical situation is most probably due to the fact that there is no counterfactual situation with which to compare the EU's economies. The ideal would be to go back in time, not go ahead European integration, wait just over 50 years and then compare the situation obtained with the one we have today. We would then know whether European integration really has generated the results wanted. However, given that such an exercise is clearly impossible, economics has to get around the problem by using other investigative methods. One of these methods is to build models of the economy able to provide as faithful a reproduction of reality as possible, and then to change certain parameters representative of public policy (such as tax rates) or the environment (such as customs duties in other countries) to study their impact on the simulated economy. This is the type of method that David and Marouani use to evaluate some of the expected effects of regional integration, not in Europe, but in two countries in the Maghreb-Mashriq area – Jordan and Tunisia – for which they simulate the impact of the free movement of migratory flows to other countries in the area.

This article's theme ties in with the focus of the third international conference on development held by DIAL right at the start of July 2015. You will find a call for papers for this conference at the end of this newsletter. The subject chosen this year is barriers to development and, more specifically, policies needed to overcome them. This issue also includes a call for papers for the 13th International Workshop on Pensions, Insurance and Savings to be held jointly with the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Harvard University on 28 and 29 May 2015. We look forward to seeing you all at these two events!

Philippe De Vreyer & Flore Gubert

Arab integration – what role can labour mobility play?¹

Introduction

The European Union has often stood as a regional integration model for other world regions. The EU was built in a move to find lasting peace in a region that had triggered two world wars. The first tool used was a commodity trade agreement. Initially signed by six countries (France, the former Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Benelux countries), the agreement was extended to the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland in 1973, Greece in 1981, and finally Spain and Portugal in 1986. Most integration measures since this European model, including the Arab countries' efforts, have been based on free goods trade agreements. Yet the EU has a particularity in that its members are mainly industrialised countries in which intra-industry trade plays a major role. The Arab region is made up of a mix of oil producing countries (mainly in the Gulf) and countries with relatively large labour endowments (Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia), which have based their industrialisation strategy on sub-contracting for developed country industries. Most of the region's economies are also highly dependent on imports of consumer goods from developed countries and emerging economies such as China. So, unlike the European countries, goods trade complementarities can hardly be seen as the main potential driver for Arab integration even though growth in goods trade could have a positive effect on sunrise industries by increasing the size of the market.

The service sector looks to have much more potential, as shown by the success of regional stakeholders in the telecommunications and property sectors. Here, there are complementarities to be found between the countries with high levels of capital and those with skilled manpower. Migration has played a substantial role in this and could play an even greater role in the future. Higher labour mobility could therefore generate a win-win situation: less unemployment and more growth due to a more efficient use of available resources, especially human capital. Given that some countries have an abundant labour force while others import manpower, closer cooperation to facilitate labour mobility could be beneficial to all (Hoekman & Sekkat, 2009). However, governments are generally less

receptive to the idea of facilitating labour mobility than they are to capital mobility. This can be seen from the much higher number of bilateral investment agreements and the countries' reluctance to include labour mobility provisions in their trade agreements (Stephenson & Hufbauer, 2010). The mobility of persons under GATS services trade Mode 4² could also improve growth and employment in the region, provided the many current obstacles are lifted. The Gulf countries have already started diversifying from oil production into services such as telecommunications, airlines, port industries and property businesses. Other Arab countries have skilled manpower struggling to find work on the local market. Given their cultural similarities, this type of mobility should pose fewer problems than mobility to Western countries.

The main barrier to Arab integration is political. Most of the Arab governments put on a public face of being deeply committed to the creation of an Arab Union, in view of the concept's popularity with public opinion. However, relations between Arab countries are reserved rather than set in well-defined institutional frameworks. The European Union's success, at least in the early stages, was built on more than just the creation of a common market. It was also built on common institutions. The principle of financial solidarity as a pillar of flagship projects such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the structural funds for the most remote regions also played an important role in the success of these policies. Arab governments are often opposed to the idea of any transfer of sovereignty to a regional body that might manage common projects.

Despite the Arab institutional integration project's lack of maturity, many practical aspects such as migration and major regional telecommunications players (mainly Gulf companies) have made it a reality. Conflicts in the region have also driven large numbers of refugees from

1 This article presents a few key elements on Arab integration and the potential role of labour mobility based on the seminal paper written for the Arab Human Development Report and working papers produced by the "Can Labor Mobility Enhance MENA Employment? Mode 4 versus Temporary Migration" research project, funded by the Economic Research

2 The General Agreement on Trade in Services defines four service supply modes: 1) Mode 1 – Cross-border trade; 2) Mode 2 – Consumption abroad; 3) Mode 3 – Commercial presence; 4) Mode 4 – Presence of natural persons. In the case of Mode 4 mobility, service suppliers are present in the country on a contract basis, whereas temporary migration refers to an employer-employee relationship.

one Arab country to another. In addition, informal cross-border trade is a long-standing business and a key source of income for many border regions.

An overview of the development of regional integration in the Arab countries

Arab regional integration has been a major shared stated objective since the 1950s as can be seen from a significant increase in agreements, mainly in trade in goods. Yet the implementation of these agreements is still somewhat thin on the ground. Chauffour (2011) remarks that the Arab world is more integrated by labour mobility and, to a certain extent, infrastructure links than by trade and investment.

On the trade front, despite a slight upturn in intra-Arab trade, the Arab region is still one of the least integrated regions in the world. Intra-Arab exports account for roughly just 5% of the region's total exports compared with 13% for intra-African exports and 25% for the ASEAN region. This means that the Arab countries are dependent on trade with the outside world.

However, the past decade has seen a sharp rise in intra-Arab exports, which have gradually taken over from fast declining exports to Europe. Arab exports, more diverse than non-Arab exports (which are mainly petrochemical products), comprise essentially exports of agricultural products mostly to the Mashriq countries (ESCWA, 2014). The implementation of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) in 2005 has had a positive, albeit small, impact mainly on the Maghreb countries. ESCWA (2014) estimates that the average annual growth rate of Arab intra-regional exports has grown from 3.6% over the period 2000-2004 to 4% in 2005-2010 for the Maghreb countries, whereas they have grown from 1.5% to 16.8% for the Mashriq countries. The impact has also been lower than expected on exports of agricultural products from the Maghreb to the Arab countries. Their share has grown from 4.1% to 6.5%.

Looking at financial market integration, FDI levels have been relatively low with the exception of oil and real property, which represent one-fifth of all FDI flows in the regions. Recent years have seen a fall in confidence in the region due to political and social unrest in Egypt, civil war in Syria and security lapses in oil-exporting developing countries in the region. In this climate, already falling pre-recession FDI flows

have continued to slump as the economic and political environment has worsened.

However, as pointed up by the World Bank (2013a), the sharpest drop in FDI flows has been in the tradeable sectors (agriculture, manufacturing industries) whereas FDI flows in natural resource-intensive sectors and non-tradeable sectors have barely reacted to the political instability. This has prompted withdrawals from job-creating activities.

Turning lastly to migration, one of the region's main characteristics is that it has both manpower importing and exporting countries. Yet although some countries are clearly net manpower importers (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC countries and Libya) or net manpower exporters (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Yemen), others are countries of both immigration and emigration (Jordan, Lebanon and Algeria). Migrants represent over half of the population in countries such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, with the percentage reaching 86.5% in Qatar.

This points to high potential labour mobility in the region, which in practical terms consists of labour migration to the oil-exporting countries by migrants mainly from Egypt, Yemen and Jordan. Nevertheless, despite a steady rise in manpower in GCC countries in the last decade, Arab country nationals have not benefited proportionately from this growth. Their proportion in the stock of non-nationals has fallen to the advantage of Asian workers, who now account for over half of the stocks of migrants. This switch from Arab country nationals to Asian country nationals emigrating to the Gulf countries started in the early 1980s and has moved up a gear since 2000.

Migration following the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring unrest caused temporary border breakdowns in the countries where the social uprisings erupted. Fargues & Fandrich (2012) observe that a recorded 42,807 people entered Italy illegally by sea from January to September 2011 as opposed to less than 5,000 in 2010, no more than 10,000 in 2009 and an average of less than 19,000 in the previous decade. When war broke out in Libya in February 2011, Libyans and migrant workers started fleeing to neighbouring countries heading in particular for Egypt, Tunisia, Nigeria and Chad. They ultimately totalled about 1,130,000 refugees, some 423,000 of whom were Libyans. The second

refugee crisis triggered by the Arab Spring started in Syria in the summer of 2011 and peaked in 2012.

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that over two million Syrian refugees have fled the country since the conflict began in 2011. The main destination countries are Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. Although refugees are not generally considered in matters of regional integration, we believe their impact on host country labour markets and the solidarity and support that this situation has created between countries are such that they at least merit mention in a regional integration analysis.

The World Bank (2013b) believes that the Syrian conflict could have a strong negative impact on Lebanon's GDP, cutting growth by 2.9 percentage points every year. The massive influx of refugees has created a surge in demand for public services, currently being met through a decline in both access to and the quality of public service delivery. The Syrian crisis could also aggravate the already-difficult labour market situation with its high unemployment rate and prevalence of low-quality, low-productivity jobs.

Alternative forms of integration – development assistance, student mobility and informal trade

The GCC countries provided a huge amount of aid to Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen to support their political transitions (7.1 billion dollars, representing 40% of all official disbursements from the beginning of 2011 to September 2012). Part of this aid was humanitarian, especially for Tunisia, Syria and Yemen. It is interesting to note that the data shows that aid from the GCC countries – especially from the United Arab Emirates – to MENA region transition countries was fairly low before the Arab Spring (Rouis, 2013) and that this aid was recently extended to the abovementioned countries (pledges of nearly 40 billion dollars as of July 2013). Egypt was earmarked for 55% of this aid and over half of it arrived in July 2013 following Morsi's removal from office.

Cross-border higher education could also foster regional mobility. Firstly, it can provide the expertise needed in an environment where the education systems do not produce enough graduates with the required skills (World Bank, 2011). Secondly, it could provide a solution to youth unemployment in the region.

A third form of integration is informal cross-border trade, which has shot up in the recent

period. However, very little data is available to be able to evaluate it. El Bahri (2011) estimates the illegal market for veterinary products (operating through underground channels at the borders) at 15% of turnover for the Arab Maghreb Union. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA, 2013) reports that Egypt loses four billion Egyptian pounds of tax receipts (about 662 million dollars) annually due to illicit trade in cigarettes to neighbouring Maghreb countries. Informal trade between Morocco and Algeria is estimated at two billion dollars (Global Arab Network, 2011).

The economic gains of reducing barriers to mobility – the case of Jordan and Tunisia

It could be beneficial to develop GATS Mode 4 worker mobility for both host and home countries (Hoekman & Ozden, 2010). This type of mobility has lower political and socio-cultural costs in host countries compared with traditional temporary migration and could stem brain drain while giving skilled Arab workers new opportunities. Yet trade in services is often restricted by nationality and skills requirements. Borchert *et al.* (2012) show that Mode 4 is the most heavily regulated form of mobility and that the Gulf countries have the most restrictive service trade policies.

David & Marouani (2013) illustrate the economic advantages of reducing barriers to mobility based on the cases of Jordan and Tunisia in a general equilibrium framework. The model reveals the interactions between labour mobility and the labour market in the two countries. One channel by which labour mobility interacts with the local labour market is via the variation in demand for foreign manpower in destination countries. For example, the global crisis slashed the demand for foreign workers, which reduced the possibilities for migration. Wage trends in host countries also influence the decision to migrate, thereby determining the number of emigrants and length of migration (Stark *et al.*, 1997). Remittances can also have an impact on the labour market in source countries. Rapoport & Docquier (2006) take the hypothesis that individuals behave altruistically and show that the rate of remittances increases with the migrant's income and decreases with the income of the household of origin. This suggests that an asymmetric variation in economic conditions will have an impact on the labour market participation of households with migrant members, since their labour force participation rate depends on

total income and therefore partly on the funds sent. Lastly, Yang (2008) finds that a similar impact can be observed following differential changes in the exchange rate and rate of inflation between sending and receiving country. Hence a relative decrease in foreign wages can impact on unemployment in the source country due to a downturn in demand for labour and an upturn in the labour supply.

The model developed by David & Marouani (2013) analyses the interactions between labour mobility and the labour market. In particular, it studies the impact of an increase in emigration flows and growth in Mode 4 service exports, which entail a temporary movement of people.

Jordan and Tunisia both have abundant manpower and a high rate of emigration. They have taken more or less the same economic liberalisation road over the last two decades and today post high unemployment rates despite relatively high, steady growth trends. Tunisia has a huge stock of migrants, whereas Jordan posts higher migrant flows and a larger share of remittances in its GDP.

Looking at sector exports, wages earned by workers abroad and remittances as a percentage of total service exports, it can be observed that business service exports account for 12.8% of the total for Jordan while they come to just 5.3% of the total for Tunisia. This would make Mode 4 exports potentially higher in Jordan than in Tunisia. The relatively significant share of wages earned by workers abroad in Jordan's case suggests that work is exported via other channels and the high level of remittances (70.5% of total service exports) points up the weight of labour mobility.

The authors firstly simulate a 20% annual increase in potentially Mode 4-intensive exports.³ A country's balance of payments can give an idea of the value of service exports, but it does not differentiate between Mode 1, Mode 2 and Mode 4 exports. It can prove difficult to isolate the value of Mode 4 services in total exports, but, as pointed out by Cattaneo & Walkenhorst (2010), Mode 4 mobility is an important element in service sectors such as accounting, construction, engineering, information technology, and legal services.

3 The sectors considered as being potentially Mode 4-intensive are: information and communication technologies, banking and insurance, other financial services, and business services.

The second scenario analysed is an increase in emigration flows resulting from a rise in expected wage abroad of 30% per year over the 2011-2015 period.

Jordan

The simulation of the liberalisation of potentially Mode 4-intensive services in Jordan finds a positive, but small impact on GDP growth (0.15% on average over the 2013-2014 period). It also drives a slight upturn in demand for manpower and the labour market participation rate and a downturn in emigration. The unemployment rate consequently falls 0.25 percentage points per year on average. The results find an increase in the labour supply in response to the decrease in remittances. This drop in migrant remittances is due partly to the fall in emigration and the rise in the exchange rate induced by the upturn in exports, and partly to the increase in household incomes. Indeed, under the model's assumption of the altruistic behaviour of migrants, migrants' remittances drop when the standard of living of their household of origin improves.

The findings also show that the shock's positive effects are not spread evenly across the different levels of education. The benefits, in terms of both the decrease in unemployment and the increase in wages, grow with the level of education. The main beneficiaries of any Mode 4 agreements would then be the older (over 30 years old) high-skilled workers, since they are overrepresented in the potentially Mode 4-intensive service sectors. The shock's impact by skills level is also reflected in the structure of emigration, with the sharpest drop in migratory flows found for the high-skilled workers.

The second simulation shows, as expected, that the increase in foreign wages drives an upturn in emigration and remittances. This growth in migrant remittances in turn has a negative impact on the local labour market participation rate. The joint effect of the increase in emigration and the decrease in the participation rate induces a downturn in the unemployment rate and higher local wages. These wage increases have a negative impact on the demand for manpower. As migrant remittances account for a large proportion of Jordan's GDP, an increase in these remittances would significantly raise investment, which would drive a higher economic growth rate.

The main beneficiaries in terms of a reduction in unemployment would be the unskilled and me-

dium-skilled workers, whose participation rate would fall sharply due to the larger share of remittances in their total income. The upshot of this would be to give high-skilled workers more of an incentive to emigrate compared with the other categories of workers.

Tunisia

Liberalisation of trade in Mode 4 services in Tunisia would have a small positive macroeconomic impact on GDP growth, despite a positive effect on investment and demand for labour. Emigration would fall due to the shock's positive impact on employment and wages, illustrating the hypothesis of substitution between Mode 4 exports and migration. Currency appreciation, induced by export growth, and a decrease in migratory flows have a negative impact on the level of remittances, which falls 4.5% on average per year. The fall in remittances and the rise in investment, and hence capital income, have opposite effects on the participation rate and the findings show that the capital effect wins out and the participation rate slides back slightly.

An upturn in Mode 4 exports has a positive effect on unemployment, which falls 0.8 percentage points on average per year. The decrease is sharper for high-skilled workers, since Mode 4 services are skilled manpower-intensive sectors. In addition, the growth in investment has a positive effect on demand for highly educated manpower due to the strong complementarity between capital accumulation and demand for skills. Moreover, emigration per skills category follows the same trend as unemployment, with skilled migration falling more than the other categories and hence stemming brain drain.

The findings also show that the not-so-young workers (over 30 years old) benefit more from this shock than the young. This means that Mode 4 trade liberalisation would widen the gap between the young and the not so young in terms of both unemployment and wages.

The second simulation observes that the main impact of higher foreign wages is a sharp rise in emigration and remittances. This has a negative impact on the participation rate. Higher emigration and less labour market participation bring down the unemployment rate and drive up local wages (via the wage curve). This has a negative impact on the demand for manpower.

The results find a downturn in unemployment rates by skills level, especially for unskilled and

medium-skilled workers. These different trends can be explained by two factors: the initial unemployment rates (which, being lower for unskilled workers, respond more) and the variation in participation rates (higher for medium-skilled workers). The participation rate for medium-skilled workers falls more than for the other categories, since households rich in medium-skilled manpower receive, in percentage terms, over half of the remittances while high-skilled households receive a very small proportion.

Although the shock on migrants' wages is symmetrical across the skills levels, emigration grows relatively more among the highly skilled since their local wages increase less than the other categories due to the small variation in their participation rate.

Lastly, young workers benefit more from the shock in terms of both wages and unemployment, since their participation rate falls relatively more than the participation rate of the not-so-young workers.

Conclusion

Regional integration could help the Arab countries to solve their structural problems such as youth unemployment and a strong dependence on oil. However, political constraints are holding back the deep integration needed and the current instability is piling new problems on top of old. One option is to start with greater service market integration and more labour mobility. A good starting point for reform could be to issue special long-term visas for business people, researchers and students. A second idea could be to get plans to mutually recognise qualifications properly underway.

Unofficial regional integration takes the form of refugees and informal cross-border trade. All Arab countries should work on easing the problems faced by refugees and their host countries. The informal trade problem could be addressed by reducing trade barriers between Arab countries and reducing the domestic imbalances (such as oil subsidies) that make this type of trade highly lucrative.

Special youth programmes such as grants to study in another Arab country could facilitate long-term integration. The creation of centres of excellence in different fields in each country could help attract the best foreign students and researchers and hence make large economies of scale.

Civil society has a key role to play in this highly sensitive period to convince political leaders of the importance of giving young people hope for a brighter future. The new Arab integration project needs to be based on sounder foundations than those defined in the 1950s. It needs to be realistically defined with consideration for security problems, the political economy and social constraints in the different countries.

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List of 2014 working papers
These papers can be downloaded from the DIAL website
(www.dial.ird.fr)

DT 2014-01	Political Economy of growth and poverty in Burkina Faso: Power, Institutions and Rents Estelle Koussoubé, Augustin Loada, Gustave Nebié, Marc Raffinot
DT 2014-02	To Have and Have Not”: Migration, Remittances, Poverty and Inequality in Algeria David Margolis, Luis Miotti, El Mouhoub Mouhoud, Joël Oudinet
DT 2014-03	Le marché du travail en Haïti après le séisme : quelle place pour les jeunes ? François Roubaud, Constance Torelli, Claire Zanuso
DT 2014-04	Adjustment of the Vietnamese Labour Market in Time of Economic fluctuations and Structural Changes Xavier Oudin, Laure Pasquier-Doumer, Thai Pham-Minh, François Roubaud, Dat Vu-Hoang
DT 2014-05	Skill Mismatch and Migration in Egypt and Tunisia Anda David, Christophe J. Nordman
DT 2014-06	Inequality of Opportunity in Health in Indonesia Florence Jusot, Sabine Mage, Marta Menendez
DT 2014-07	Do informal businesses gain from registration? Benefits of Household Businesses formalization in Vietnam Axel Demenet, Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud
DT 2014-08	L'étalon-or des évaluations randomisées : du discours de la méthode à l'économie politique Florent Bédécarrats, Isabelle Guérin, François Roubaud
DT 2014-09	Trade Performance of Free Trade Zones Jean-Marc Siroën, Ayçil Yücer
DT 2014-10	What Drives Land Sales and Rentals in Rural Africa: Evidence from Western Burkina Faso Estelle Koussoubé
DT 2014-11	Conditional Cash Transfers and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Colombia Cindy Cardenas, Elodie Djemai
DT 2014-12	Elites, pouvoir et régulation à Madagascar : une relecture de l'histoire Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud, Jean-Michel Wachsberger
DT 2014-13	Employment Growth, Productivity and Jobs reallocations in Tunisia: A Microdata Analysis Mohamed Ali Marouani, Rim Mouelhi
DT 2014-14	Segmentation and informality in Vietnam: A Survey of Literature. Country case study on labour segmentation Jean-Pierre Cling, Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud
DT 2014-15	Benefit in the wake of disaster: Long-run effects of earthquakes on welfare in rural Indonesia Jérémy Gignoux, Marta Menendez
DT 2014-16	Female genital mutilation and migration in Mali. Do migrants transfer social norms? Idrissa Diabate, Sandrine Mesplé-Somps
DT 2014-17	Are Migrants Agents of Democratic Diffusion? Suggestive Evidence from Mali Lisa Chauvet, Flore Gubert, Sandrine Mesplé-Somps
DT 2014-18	Cities of Commerce: how can we test the hypothesis? Guillaume Daudin
DT 2014-19	Borders that Divide: Education and Religion in Ghana and Togo since Colonial Times Denis Cogneau, Alexander Moradi
DT 2014-20	Institutions historiques et développement économique en Afrique. Une revue sélective et critique de travaux récents Denis Cogneau, Yannick Dupraz
DT 2014-21	Jalons pour une économie politique de la trajectoire malgache : une perspective de long terme Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud, Jean-Michel Wachsberger
DT 2014-23	Le marché du travail en République Démocratique du Congo en 2012 : principaux résultats de la phase 1 de l'enquête 1-2-3 Grégoire Kankwanda, Timothée Makabu Ma Nkenda, Björn Nilsson, François Roubaud, Constance Torelli, Jean-Michel Wachsberger
DT 2014-24	The Labor Market Effects of Skill-biased Technological Change in Malaysia Mohamed Ali Marouani, Björn Nilsson
DT 2014-25	Deep integration: free trade agreements heterogeneity and its impact on bilateral trade Jaime Rafael Ahear, Jean-Marc Siroën

Call for papers

Barriers to development

DIAL Development Economics Conference

The University of Paris-Dauphine and French Institute of Research for Development

July 2nd and 3rd 2015, Paris

The University of Paris-Dauphine (UPD) and the French Institute of Research for Development (IRD) jointly organize their third international conference on development economics. The conference which will be held in Paris should provide a forum to discuss innovative theoretical and empirical research in development economics dealing particularly with the analysis of factors that can tackle barriers to development. Interested researchers are invited to send a paper dealing with one of the following topics:

- Markets or States failures
- Frontiers, geographical mobility, transport
- Social mobility
- Inequality and poverty
- Trust and social cohesion

Keynote speakers:

Marc Raffinot, UMR DIAL, LEDa, Université Paris-Dauphine

Vijayendra Rao, Lead Economist in the Research Department of the World Bank

Philip Verwimp, Professeur, ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles

Preliminary versions of papers can be submitted, but abstracts alone will not be accepted.

Please submit your proposals including keywords and a 150 word abstract in PDF form by **February 15th, 2015** via the [conference website](#).

The scientific committee will evaluate all proposals and give particular attention to originality, analytical rigor and policy relevance. The results of the selection process will be announced by **April 4th, 2015**.

Scientific committee:

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CALL FOR PAPERS

13th International Workshop on Pensions, Insurance and Savings, University Paris Dauphine Paris, May 28th29, 2015.

We are pleased to announce a new call for papers for the “13th international workshop on pensions, insurance and savings”; the aim of the workshop is to provide researchers a friendly environment to present and discuss their latest research. We invite contributions on all aspects of the social sciences related to financial markets, demographic risks and governance in developed and developing countries. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:

1. Rules/criteria for pension fund investment and savings, capital markets and economic growth in developing countries.
2. Pension funds investment in developing countries.
3. Pension plan design, risk sharing and distribution among generations, macroeconomic aspects of ageing and retirement in developed and developing countries
4. The need for annuities and other pay-out mechanisms and how it best can be met
5. Pension plan design in light of labor market evolution, especially as it concerns new traditional and emerging informal sectors.
6. Insurance: formal and informal
7. The opportunities and challenges of infrastructure as an object of pension fund investment
8. Institutions and rules for pension fund investment governance

Deadlines:

Researchers interested in presenting a paper are requested to submit a complete version to international.pension.workshop@gmail.com with “Submission” in the subject line by **March 30, 2015** and researchers interested in discussing a paper are strongly encouraged to inform by end of March at the latest. Participants are encouraged to stay for the full two days of the workshop.

Expenses:

Participation in the workshop is free. Authors of selected papers without travel funding may apply for subsidies, subject to the availability of funds, although it is expected participants cover their own travel and accommodation costs.

For further questions, or information about the workshop please feel free to write to us at international.pension.workshop@gmail.com

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Where are they now? Four PhD graduates tell us.

Sayfeddine Bejaoui: “After I graduated, I had the opportunity to broaden my work experience in the field of impact evaluation at the World Bank. I have been working on the impact assessment of some interventions aimed at promoting education in developing countries. I am now revising some of my research papers in order to submit them for publication and get ready for the next recruitment campaign for lecturers that will take place in Tunisia in April 2015.”

Nathalie Guilbert: “I’ve been working as an economist for the World Bank’s Gender Innovation Lab (GIL) (<http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/africa-gender-innovationlab>) for five months now. I’ve been working on interventions designed to improve the socioeconomic conditions of women in Africa, from the design of these interventions to their impact assessment. More specifically, I have been involved in the impact assessment of interventions aimed at preventing sexual violence against women and girls in the Great Lakes region in Central Africa, improving the integration of women in high added-value sectors in Nigeria, and providing social security services in drought-prone Sahelian countries.”

Mélanie Kuhn: “I’m in charge of economic studies at FranceAgriMer (<http://www.franceagrimer.fr/>), a government agency working on agricultural and fishery issues in liaison with the Ministry for Agriculture, Food and Forests. I work in the Major Crops Unit in the Markets, Studies and Research Department. I monitor French cereal harvests, write cyclical reports, collect, process and analyse data, and draw up monthly reports detailing cereal resources (production, imports, etc.) and their uses (cattle feed, human and industrial uses, exports, etc.). At the same time, I have continued to teach macroeconomics at the University of Paris Dauphine.”

Jean-Noël Senne: “After a year as a postdoctoral fellow with UMR DIAL on NOPOOR project funding, I was taken on as an Associate Professor in Economics by the University of Paris-Sud’s Networks, Innovation, Territories and Globalisation (RITM) Laboratory on 1 September 2014, where I now teach macroeconomics and econometrics. At the same time, I am continuing to work as a Research Associate with DIAL on my research on the links between migration, remittances and development in West Africa.” [Read more: <https://sites.google.com/site/jeannoelsenne/>]

Permanent call for papers for STATECO

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