Are poor neighbourhoods opposed to democracy? The case of Antananarivo, Madagascar

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ARE POOR NEIGHBOURHOODS OPPOSED TO DEMOCRACY?
THE CASE OF ANTANANARIVO, MADAGASCAR

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RESUMÉ

A Madagascar, et tout particulièrement dans la capitale, Antananarivo, les citoyens font preuve d'un soutien marqué à la démocratie : adoption de ses principes, rejet des régimes autoritaires, etc. Les populations pauvres ne se distinguent en rien des autres couches sociales sur ce plan. Néanmoins, résider dans un quartier pauvre conduit à adopter des valeurs et attitudes de défiance vis-à-vis de la démocratie, qui ne sont pas susceptibles d'être expliquées par des effets de composition sociologique. Cette étude est basée sur des enquêtes représentatives de première main, tant au niveau national que de la capitale. Les effets de quartiers, qui apparaissent comme de véritables matrices de socialisation politique, sont mis à jour grâce à une exploitation originale du plan de sondage de l'enquête. Il s'agit à notre connaissance de la première étude quantitative faisant état d'un tel phénomène en Afrique. Nous proposons un certain nombre d'interprétations à cet état de fait, qui conduisent notamment à reconsidérer le rôle positif habituellement attribué dans la littérature à la participation associative comme facteur de renforcement démocratique. Ces résultats donnent de nouveaux arguments en faveur de politiques urbaines de mixité sociale.

Mots clés : Antananarivo, Citoyenneté démocratique, Madagascar, participation associative, pauvreté, effets quartier.

ABSTRACT

The citizens of Madagascar, and especially the capital Antananarivo, display marked support for democracy: adoption of its principles, rejection of authoritarian regimes, etc. The poor populations are no different from the other social groups in this respect. Nevertheless, living in a poor district induces the adoption of values and attitudes of distrust of democracy unlikely to be explained by sociological composition effects. This study is based on representative first-hand surveys at national level and in the capital. The neighbourhood effects, which form real political socialisation vehicles, are updated by an innovative use of the survey's sampling plan. This is, to our knowledge, the first quantitative study to show such a phenomenon in Africa. We propose a certain number of interpretations of this situation, which prompt a reconsideration of the positive role that studies normally ascribe to associative participation as a factor for democratic reinforcement. These findings put forward new arguments in favour of socially balanced urban policies.

Key Words : Antananarivo, democratic citizenship, Madagascar, associative participation, poverty, neighbourhood effects.

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INTRODUCTION

The political crisis of 2002 brought to the fore the importance that the Madagascans attach to democracy (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2002). Six months of popular mobilisation forced the outgoing Head of State, Didier Ratsiraka, to acknowledge his election defeat, giving the reins of power to the current President, Marc Ravalomanana. The albeit turbulent democratic transition that started with the first truly free elections in 1992-1993 continued its march forward, strengthening democracy with a multiparty system, regular elections, alternation of power and freedom of the press. Granted, much could still be done. It is well known, for example, that the food group Tiko, headed by Marc Ravalomanana, has gained a great deal from the position and political decisions of its owner. A move to restrict freedom of speech could also be criticised[1]. However, these undeniable and worrying shortcomings are not enough to discredit the democratic nature of the system. The simple fact that they can be mentioned freely in the country's press proves this point. In any case, historical democracies are not above similar criticisms, as shown by the example of Italy. A recent survey also shows that Madagascans widely believe that progress is being made with respect for democratic principles in the country (Razafindrakoto *et al.*, 2005a).

This democratic progress is a positive factor for development when considering, as shown by A. Sen (2005) in his comparison of China and India, that democracy increases "individuals' real capacities for social choice". He states, in particular, that the proportion of people hit by famine is always lower in democratic countries due to popular pressure on their leaders.

However, democracy cannot be reduced to a mere technology that organises the appointment of leaders and the running of institutions. It must also be based on a set of shared values, top of the list of which are tolerance of the diversity of opinions, acceptance of the debating of ideas and promotion of freedom of speech. It can only really be a bearer of development and protector of the poor if the populations actively back the democratic principles and really take part in the public debate.

This paper looks at this popular support for democracy in the Madagascan capital. Although support for democracy by the Madagascans, and especially the inhabitants of Antananarivo, is solid and widespread (part one), the inhabitants of the capital's poorest neighbourhoods are systematically more wary of this form of political system (part two). This raises the question of the "effects" of poor neighbourhoods on the political opinions of their inhabitants (part three).

1   SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN MADAGASCAR

Certain social science studies posit that the values of traditional societies (Harrison and Huntington, 2000; Varshney, 1999) and especially African societies (Weissman, 1993; Faure, 1991) are incompatible with democratic principles. Traditional cultures, which reportedly place family and community before the individual and have a strong age-related hierarchy, can end up disregarding individual and political freedoms (for a critical review of these studies, see Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2005). These theses are based on the implicit principle that democracy is a Western invention that cannot easily be "exported" to the Southern countries.

Yet, as A. Sen points out time and again, especially in the abovementioned paper, "Freedom is not a Western invention." As regards Africa in general, Evans-Pritchard and Fortes (1964) said as far back as in 1940 that, "The structure of an African State implies that kings and chiefs rule by consensus." On the subject of Madagascar in particular, elements can easily be found in the Madagascan culture to show that democratic principles are not absent from the society. For example, one proverb asserts

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[1]   Closure of private radio stations in Toamasina and Toliara; non-renewal of the French RFI correspondent's visa in 2005 and expulsion of Christian Chadefaux, the founder of the *l'Express* magazine and Editor-in-Chief of the *Les Nouvelles* newspaper, in 2006; ban on public meetings by the opposition in November and December 2005, etc.

human equality[2]. One fundamental value, *Fihavanana*, referred to in the preamble to the constitution of the third Republic of 1992[3] (Razafindratsima, 2005) and evoked by Mr Ravalomanana in his inauguration speech[4], advocates mutual assistance, compromise, mutual exchanges and dialogue[5]. One tradition, *Kabary*, huge assemblies called by the sovereigns to obtain the people's support for decisions, could be seen as an original form of democracy. A village community organisation, *Fokonolona*, allows for the democratic exercise of power by the assembly of all, which is governed by a strict equality of participants (Condominas, 1991; Andrianjafy-Andrianmanindrisoa, 2004). We could also mention how far back Madagascan political unification goes, set in motion by the Maroseranana dynasty in the 7th century and continued by the sovereigns of Imerina through to the end of the 19th century (Rakotoarisoa, 2002). Consequently, although ethnic membership is meaningful to the Madagascans, its translation into the political field remains secondary compared with many other African countries (Roubaud, 2000; Ramamonjisoa, 2002) despite frequent attempts by certain politicians to politically manipulate the ethnic groups[6]. The 2005 *Afrobarometer* survey moreover clearly shows that, "For a great many Madagascans, national identity comes before ethnic identity". (Razafindrakoto *et al.*, 2005b).

We use the findings of the 2005 *Afrobarometer* survey and the 2003 *1-2-3 Survey*'s *Governance and Democracy* module to report on Madagascan support for democracy. Although the two surveys use different measurement instruments, they both find that Madagascan support for democracy is in the majority (and massive in the capital) despite being not completely unambiguous.

1.1   Democratic citizenship in Madagascar

The 2005 *Afrobarometer* survey reports on the Madagascans' attachment to democracy and measures their "democratic citizenship". This, as pointed out by M. Bratton (2006), is based on specific political values, implies favourable opinions of democracy and is associated with a certain number of citizen behaviour patterns.

Support for the main democratic values is massive since over 70% of the Madagascans express tolerance of others' opinions, endorse freedom of speech and political organisation, and defend political equality[7]. From this point of view, democratic citizenship is particularly strong.

However, support for democratic procedures is less clear-cut. The Madagascans massively reject the idea of the country being ruled by the army, a single party or an all-powerful president. The vast majority agree with the principle of regular, free and fair elections, believe that the president should abide by the law and endorse the multiparty system. This wide support for democracy is relatively sound since it is generally not conditional on swift, concrete results[8]. However, this marked support for democratic procedures should not conceal the number of people who feel cut off from democratic concerns. A full 33% of Madagascans consider that the type of government is of no consequence to them. This is far from the highest percentage of the 18 countries that took part in the third wave of *Afrobarometer* surveys (Wachsberger, 2006a). Yet the number of these democratically disaffected

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[2] *ny olombelona toy ny fandrin-drano*, ka *tsy misy avo sy iva*: *men* are like the surface of still water: there is no up or down (Rasolonjatovo, 2002).

[3] "The sovereign Malagasy people [are] profoundly attached to their cultural and spiritual values, especially to the basis of national unity [*Fihavanana*]."

[4] "We will strengthen our *Fihavanana*. That same unity that was so dear to our ancestors. *Fihavanana* will be the very essence of our democracy and will serve as the basis for our government. A government that will see the participation of all the Nation's driving forces steered by a real and sincere will to swiftly develop our Country, which can never be the work of just one man, but the responsibility of every one of us." (6 May 2002)

[5] *ny teny* ierana *tsy mba loza; tsy misy mangidy noho ny sakay, fa raha teny ierana dia hanina:* Consultations cannot do any harm; nothing is more spicy than chilli, but if you decide to eat it, then you find a way (Rasolonjatovo, 2002)

[6] During the 2002 crisis, the former president D. Ratsiraka accused M. Ravalomanana of trying to establish the domination of the Merina bourgeoisie of Antananarivo over the island.

[7] Nearly three-quarters of the Madagascans (73%) think that everyone should be able to freely express their political views even if they are contrary to popular ideas; 72% of Madagascans support the right to participate in any organisation, regardless of whether the government approves; a huge majority (88%) thinks that everyone should have the right to vote, even if they do not totally understand the election issues; 79% of individuals feel that women should have the same rights and be treated the same as men.

[8] Only 31% of Madagascans believe that if the current system does not produce results in the near future, another form of government should be tried out, whereas 56% feel that the current system of elected government should be given more time to address the problems inherited from the past.

individuals could foster the establishment of an undemocratic system due to a lack of interest in the State or effective support.

Lastly, democratic citizenship appears to be problematic from the point of view of citizen behaviour. Despite a high and regular turnout in elections[9], interest in the State and individual and collective mobilisation are limited. Only 48% of Madagascans say they are interested (fairly or very) in public affairs. Political topics are virtually never or very occasionally raised in the family or with friends (only 12% of Madagascans say that they frequently discuss politics with their friends or family members and 48% never talk about politics). This is the lowest percentage of the 18 countries studied in the third wave of the *Afrobarometer* surveys in 2005 (Wachsberger, 2007). This lack of interest in politics is combined with a low level of political mobilisation. Individually, Madagascans virtually never take the initiative to meet "political" representatives, whether local councillors, National Assembly representatives, ministers, senior civil servants, party officials, religious heads or even traditional chiefs. Collectively, however, 72% of Madagascans say that they have gathered with other people at some point in time to address a problem, but only 46% have done so several times or often. Moreover, participation in protests is massively rejected by nearly two-thirds of Madagascans, who say that they never attend a demonstration.

The *1-2-3 Survey Governance and Democracy* modules analyse citizenship in the capital in more detail since, being linked to the employment surveys, they provide more socio-economic information on the Antananarivians (sample of 3,000 people compared with 1,350 at national level for the *Afrobarometer* survey). The 2003 survey used here (whose findings are consistent with those obtained by the two previous surveys; Rakotomanana, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2004) shows that democratic citizenship is much more developed in the capital than in the rest of the country.

Firstly, this survey again finds massive support for democracy. In keeping with the findings of the *Afrobarometer* survey, this support for democracy goes hand in hand with the rejection of authoritarian governments[10]. The attachment to democracy is therefore more unconditional than in the rest of the country. Criticisms of democracy are relatively limited[11] and there appears to be extremely wide support for democratic values in the capital with over 90% of adults viewing as fundamental freedom of speech, equality before the law, freedom of party choice, free and transparent elections, the freedom to travel and religious freedom. Lastly, interest in the State and citizen mobilisation is greater in the capital, especially when it comes to protests. Although only 43% of Antananarivians say that they are very or fairly interested in politics, 53% say that they often discuss politics with their friends and family and 48% state that they have already taken part in movements (petitions, strikes or demonstrations), reflecting the extent of the popular mobilisation during the 2002 crisis[12].

1.2 Distrust of democracy

The massive support for democratic principles in the capital begs the question as to the characteristics of those who openly express their distrust of its system, contrary to the prescribed norm of "social desirability". To answer this question, we have built a democratic distrust indicator based on the two most general questions on support for democracy: "Are you generally in favour of democracy?" and "Are you in favour of having a democratic political system to govern the country?" The combination of both questions makes for a more robust indicator, since a minor variation in the questions put in a survey can create major variations in the answers (Godechot, 2000). When the "in favour" and "very much in favour" answers are grouped together on one side with the "not really in favour" and "not at all in favour" answers on the other, the consistency of the answers is found to be strong: only 11% of

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[9]   A full 83% of adults were registered on the electoral roll for the 2002 general election and 77% actually voted.

[10]   88% of the inhabitants of the capital are in favour or very much in favour of democracy, and 91% are in favour or very much in favour of having a democratic political system to govern the country. Nearly 90% of Antananarivians are against one-man rule or military rule (77% of Antananarivians simultaneously reject the two forms of authoritarian government). There is therefore little of what M. Bratton (2002) calls "residual attachments" to a non-democratic system.

[11]   29% of Antananarivians feel that democracies are unable to maintain law and order and 34% believe that the economy does not work well in a democracy.

[12]   The *Afrobarometer* survey also finds this higher percentage of political mobilisation among the inhabitants of the capital: 29% of the inhabitants of greater Antananarivo stated that they had taken part in a demonstration at least once in the twelve months preceding the survey, as opposed to an average of 13% for the country as a whole.

individuals gave different (and apparently contradictory) answers to the two questions and 16% of Antananarivians overall gave a negative answer to one or the other of these questions. In the following, we will qualify this attitude of "distrust of democracy".

Generally speaking, distrust of democracy is frequently associated with attitudes and opinions that could be deemed antidemocratic (Table 1). It increases the probability of being critical of democracy in general: accusations of a poorly run economy, an inability to make decisions and incapacity to maintain law and order. And it especially raises the probability of supporting a non-democratic system of government, whether ruled by "experts" or autocratic.

And it is particularly closely associated with the feeling that democracy does not work well in the country and that human rights are not respected. Therefore, it could well express more a generally negative view of democracy in the country than a pure and simple rejection of democratic principles. So distrust might express less a condemnation of the democratic system than disappointment due to its not living up to an ideal or its inability to satisfy the expectations generated by its introduction.

Bear in mind that the survey in question was conducted one year after the 2002 political crisis and that distrust of democracy is also tied in with disappointment at the outcome of 2002 movement. Although a great many of those who distrust democracy said they were in favour of the change of president, a much larger percentage felt that the movement had not generated a new impetus or change of attitude (46% as opposed to 23%) and especially that there had been no change in the way government affairs were run (22% compared with 8%). More people were also found to be pessimistic about their personal prospects.

Distrust of democracy is therefore based on antidemocratic values, doubts about the effectiveness of democracies in general, criticism of how democracy is run in Madagascar and personal disappointment.

Table 1: Consistency of the opinions of individuals expressing a distrust of democracy

%	Total	Negative opinion of democracy	Odds Ratio *	95% confidence interval	
Agrees with the following statements:					
Democracies are unable to maintain law and order	29	38	1.64	1.33	2.02
Democracies find it hard to make decisions	34	56	2.14	1.75	2.63
The economy does not work well in a democracy	26	40	2.24	1.81	2.76
In favour of the following types of system:					
Military rule of the country	14	17	1.36	1.04	1.79
Experts, and not a government, decide what is good for the country	36	58	2.90	2.37	3.50
One-man rule by a strong leader who does not have to worry about parliament or elections	14	28	3.29	2.59	4.19
Negative opinion of democracy in the country:					
Human rights are not respected in the country	35	60	3.33	2.70	4.09
Democracy does not work well in the country	27	60	5.65	4.57	6.98
Outlook following the crisis:					
The crisis has not generated a new impetus or change of attitude	23	46	3.54	2.87	4.38
Since the end of the crisis, the running of affairs has neither changed nor shown any positive signs	8	22	5.24	3.94	6.97
Personal prospects					
In the coming year, your personal situation will remain the same or deteriorate	32	50	2.47	2.02	3.03
You are pessimistic or very pessimistic about how your own life will evolve in the future	15	25	2.12	1.66	2.70

Source : *1-2-3 Survey*, Governance and Democracy module, 2003, DIAL/INSTAT/MADIO. Authors' calculations.
Reading: 29% of the capital's inhabitants feel that democracies are unable to maintain law and order, but 38% of those who have a negative opinion of democracy think this way. This corresponds to an odds ratio of 1.64.
* The odds ratio is the ratio of two "probabilities": here, it is the relative probability of agreeing with a given statement when one has a negative opinion of democracy (% of individuals who agree/% of individuals who disagree) compared with the relative probability of agreeing with this same statement when one has a positive opinion of democracy.

We endeavour to identify which of the individuals' sociodemographic characteristics are most likely to explain this distrust by considering in turn the characteristics of individual position (age, gender and qualifications), economic integration (income and professional situation), family and community

status (marital status, type of household, ethnic group, caste and religion) and social experiences and trajectories (job insecurity and housing insecurity).

Overall, although the variations observed by individual characteristics are significant, they remain small. At their maximum, they might be double for the statistically large categories without the proportion of people distrustful of democracy ever exceeding one in five individuals (Table 2). The combination of all these characteristics in a logistic model (Table 5, Model A) bears out some of the findings of the bivariate analysis such as the influence of gender (women are more distrustful of democracy than men), the intensity of religious observance (trust in democracy increases markedly with the level of religious practice) and the difference experiences of insecurity (having been homeless at least once or having been unemployed for six months or more both foster the expression of antidemocratic attitudes). However, it does not give rise to an explanatory model of distrust of democracy ($R^2 = 0.05$). Hence neither the bivariate analysis nor the multivariate analysis determines a "standard" individual profile of individuals expressing a distrust of democracy. This means that individual opinions cannot be pigeonholed in a simple deterministic model.

Yet one variable does have a significant effect on the probability of expressing distrust of democracy. This is the residential "neighbourhood" variable. Distrust of democracy is much more frequent in the poorest neighbourhoods and the poorer the neighbourhood, the more often this view is expressed. We will look more closely at this residential neighbourhood effect in the following.

Table 2: Distrust of democracy by individual characteristics

%	Structure	Proportion distrustful	%	Structure	Proportion distrustful
Individual position and economic integration					
Age			**Household income per C.U.**		
18-24	21	13	Decile1	10	18
25-34	24	21	Quintile 1	20	16
35-44	22	19	Quartile 1	25	18
45-54	22	14	Quartile 2	25	20
55-99	12	12	Quartile 3	25	13
Gender			Quartile 4	25	14
Men	49	14			
Women	51	19			
Qualifications			**Activity sector**		
None	23	20	Public	15	18
CEPE (elementary school-leaving certificate)	28	17	Formal private	23	16
BEPC (lower secondary school certificate)	25	17	Informal private	40	12
Baccalauréat or +	24	12	Out of the labour force	21	14
Family situation and community integration					
Type of household			**Religion**		
Nuclear	48	18	FJKM[13]	49	17
Extended	52	15	Other protestants	12	17
Ethnic group[14]			Others	38	16
Merina	88	17	**Religious practice**		
Betsileo	5	14	Regular	40	11
Other	7	10	Occasional	57	20
Father's caste or status group			Neither practice nor belief	3	27
Andriana	9	8			
Others	91	17			

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[13]   FJKM is the main Protestant church of Antananarivo. Approximately 46% of Antananarivians are members of this church (Roubaud, 2000)

[14]   There are 18 ethnic groups in Madagascar. The population of Antananarivo is made up mainly of the two ethnic groups of the high plateaux: the Merina (88%) and the Betsileo (5%).

Table 2: Distrust of democracy by individual characteristics (Contnd)

Trajectory and insecurity					
Unemployed for over six months			**Job insecurity**		
More than once	*22*	**18**	Always stable jobs	*42*	**18**
Once	*17*	**16**	Insecurity following stability	*5*	**23**
Never	*61*	**16**	Stability following insecurity	*13*	**10**
Homeless at least one night			Never stable or never worked	*39*	**16**
At least once	*6*	**22**			
Never	*94*	**16**			
Total	*100*	**16**	**Total**	*100*	**16**

Source: *1-2-3 Survey*, *Governance and Democracy* module, 2003, DIAL/INSTAT/MADIO. Authors' calculations.
Reading: 18-24 year olds account for 21% of Antananarivo's adult population and 13% of them say they distrust democracy.

2   TERRITORIES AND DEMOCRACY

2.1   Antananarivo's social geography and history

The conurbation of Antananarivo is not a homogeneous social space. There are substantial territorial inequalities, even though they are not always obvious at first glance due to the relative mix of housing types and the systematic disparity between the appearance of the housing and the wealth of their occupants. Many neighbourhoods in the capital have a mix of "permanent" colonial type houses, whose inhabitants may nevertheless be very poor, new housing built in concrete or stone, sometimes extremely ramshackle earth housing, and wooden and corrugated iron huts. However, an analysis of the territory shows that there is definitely a high level of differentiation and hierarchisation in the space.

The capital's historical development provides some early clues as to the how this space came to be structured. As noted by Fournet-Guerin (2004), the city was initially "organised by an extremely strict socio-topographical system" whereby the different castes[15] were assigned neighbourhoods in keeping with a geographic and altitudinal hierarchy. Antananarivo is built on and around a series of hills, the highest of which, Analamanga, reaches an altitude of 1,468 metres. The highest hill is therefore the upper part of the town where the Rova (Queen's Palace) was built and around which lived the members of the royal family and the highest born *Andriana* nobles. On the neighbouring and lower hills making up the middle town lived the different *Andriana* groups and the *Hova* lineages (free men). Lastly, the foot of the hills and the mainly marshy plains comprise the lower town where the *Andevo*, descendents of slaves, lived.

Today, the city of Antananarivo still looks at first glance as if it were set up based on this geographic structure, if not in terms of castes[16] then at least in terms of wealth. The richest neighbourhoods and the most luxurious housing are on the highest points of the capital, (relatively) sheltered from the pollution, bustle and noise of the lower town. For example, the presidential residence is near the Queen's Palace. Conversely, the poorest neighbourhoods, which the Madagascans call the "low neighbourhoods", are all on the plains of the lower town. We will therefore continue our analysis of attitudes to democracy by differentiating between the neighbourhoods.

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[15]   Madagascan society was structured through to the end of the 19th century by a system of pseudo-castes or status groups (Condominas, 1991; Raison-Jourde, 1991). This system was officially abolished by the colonial authority, but nonetheless survived insidiously as shown by a certain number of studies (Ramamonjisoa 1984; Roubaud, 2000; Fournet-Guerin, 2004).

[16]   It is hard to identify individuals' roots in terms of caste, firstly because the caste system was abolished over a century ago and, secondly, because there is somewhat of a taboo surrounding these roots. Moreover, the populations are much more intermixed today than at the beginning of the last century, which means that descendents of the different castes can be found at different town levels. C. Fournet Guérin (2004) points out, however, that many Antananarivians maintain this hierarchical concept of the space and even develops the idea of the town having an invisible geography.

2.2 Statistical analysis of the neighbourhoods

A statistical analysis of the neighbourhoods raises two key methodological questions. The first is how to define the neighbourhood borders. The second is how to define the neighbourhood differentiation and organisation criteria.

In the survey, individuals are systematically asked questions about their housing, their neighbourhood and their relations with their neighbours. Yet the neighbourhoods are never named. Their delineation is therefore dependent on each respondent's subjective view. We know from more detailed surveys (Benoît-Guilbot, 1986; Authier, 2001) that the neighbourhood often has "variable geometry" and may be seen as just one street or block by some while extending over an extremely wide area for others. This poses a definite problem when it comes to aggregating answers, in that there is nothing to say that people from the same district have identified their neighbourhood in the same way. However, the town's administrative organisation suggests that the Antananarivians see their neighbourhood as a *Fokontany*. The *Fokontany* is the smallest Madagascan administrative unit. For example, in Antananarivo Renivohitra (the administrative capital), there are 192 *Fokontanys* governed by a chairman appointed by the mayor at the suggestion of the population meeting in a general assembly. This chairman plays the traditional role of village head (*Fokontanys* are villages in rural areas). This political organisation of *Fokontanys* means that they are clearly identified by the Antananarivians. For example, they often have their own sports clubs and neighbourhood associations. The sampling plan used for Antananarivo is such that analyses can be made by *Fokontany*. The plan is based on the technique of two-level stratified area surveys, the first consisting of a sample of segments (mainly *Fokontanys*), of the urban conurbation of Antananarivo, and the second selecting households in these segments (Rakotomanana, Razafindrakoto, Roubaud, 2004). At the second level, the household sample was formed by systematic random household sampling after exhaustively enumerating these households in all of the 108 segments. The households sampled in each enumeration area therefore roughly represent the neighbourhoods (*Fokontany*) and can be used as a basis for analyses and testing assumptions (for the *1-2-3 Survey* modules, a third level consisted of a random sample of one adult in each household for a total of 28 adults on average per enumeration area).

An analysis of the spatial differentiations between enumeration areas, using indicators developed by D. Goux and E. Maurin (2004a) and Maurin (2004), finds that the households are not randomly distributed over the territory, but are organised in keeping with specific social reasoning as we have shown elsewhere (Wachsberger, 2006b). For example, 6.5% of the neighbourhoods have no households in the first decile of income per consumption unit (C.U.; see Ravelosoa – 1999 for a definition of C.U.s). This is 9.3 times the proportion that should have been found if the households had been distributed randomly over the territory, which points to the exclusion of the poorest households from a large number of neighbourhoods.

We therefore subsequently differentiate the districts by average resident household income per C.U. and rank them by quantiles. We pay particular attention to the poorest neighbourhoods, since it is in these districts that the rejection of democracy is the most marked. For the sake of brevity, we will give the title of "poor neighbourhoods" to those districts corresponding to the quartile (and sometimes the quintile or decile) in which average incomes are the lowest. We compare them with those in the highest income quartile (hereinafter called "rich neighbourhoods").

The socio-economic characteristics of the neighbourhoods' inhabitants show the pertinence of our typology (Table 3). The poor neighbourhoods generally appear to be seriously run down. A tiny proportion of individuals in these districts have access to running water (8%) and toilets with a septic tank (2%), whereas the majority of the inhabitants of the rich neighbourhoods have these facilities (64% and 52% respectively). The environment also seems to be more dilapidated, as much from the point of view of the upkeep of the buildings as cleanliness in general. The poor neighbourhoods have a higher population density per housing unit, with an average of 2.6 individuals per room (3.1 in the neighbourhoods in the first quintile) as opposed to 1.9 in the rich neighbourhoods. Lastly, the poor neighbourhoods, as we have mentioned, are geographically concentrated in the lower town, which extends in part over former paddy-fields that have not always been properly backfilled. A good proportion of the homes in these areas are therefore at risk of frequent flooding during the rainy season

and hence infectious and diarrhoeal diseases such as cholera and tuberculosis (Randremanana *et al.*, 2001).

Table 3: Housing and inhabitant characteristics by type of neighbourhood

	Type of neighbourhood (average income per C.U.)					
	First quintile	Poor (Q1)	Q2	Q3	Rich (Q4)	Total
Type of housing						
Permanent structure	40	39	50	66	77	56
Access to electricity	50	56	79	84	91	74
Running water	7	8	23	32	64	27
Toilet with septic tank	2	2	8	15	52	15
Lack of cleanliness	42	40	34	25	17	30
Dilapidated buildings	38	35	18	9	7	18
Neighbourhood sociology						
Head of household's level of education						
Primary school or less	59	58	53	43	29	21
Middle school	28	30	31	27	31	25
Secondary	11	10	12	23	21	23
Higher education	3	3	3	7	19	30
Individuals under 18 years old	49	50	49	45	39	36
Overall labour force participation rate aged 10 and over	63	60	63	60	58	56
Adult female labour force participation rate	72	69	73	68	65	61
Rate of jobs in the informal sector	73	72	69	66	53	44
Violence, drugs and public safety						
Feeling of lack of safety	22	22	22	20	22	15
Problems with violence	38	33	34	30	33	24
Problems with drugs	40	43	46	43	36	33
Poor reputation	44	43	40	37	28	23
Three or four of these problems	25	24	24	22	19	14

Source: *1-2-3 Survey*, *Governance and Democracy* module, 2003, DIAL/INSTAT/MADIO. Authors' calculations.
Reading: 40% of the inhabitants of the neighbourhoods in the first average income quintile live in permanent structures.

The poor neighbourhoods also post higher labour force participation rates (particularly among the women) and a high percentage of people working in the informal sector. Their inhabitants are younger than in the other neighbourhoods (especially in terms of the proportion of individuals under 18 years old) and they have a low average level of education.

Lastly, the inhabitants of the poor neighbourhoods are more often faced with a certain number of neighbourhood problems. Although these problems are often mentioned by the Antananarivians as a whole, they are more frequent in the poorest neighbourhoods. They are moreover closely correlated (Cronbach's alpha = 0.72). When they are aggregated, it is found that the poorer the neighbourhood, the greater the combination of negative perceptions.

The poor neighbourhoods form a "concentrated aggregate of all the urban ills" (Collectif, 1998): "permanent threat of flooding in the rainy season, overcrowding, serious hygiene and public health problems, (…), precarious security and a notorious lack of facilities." As we shall see, all these elements are liable to influence the attitudes, behaviour and political values of their inhabitants.

2.3 Poor neighbourhoods and democracy

As mentioned above, the analysis of attitudes to democracy by neighbourhood reveals marked differences. The poorer the neighbourhood, the higher the percentage of people distrustful of democracy. For example, 20% of the inhabitants of the poor neighbourhoods (first quartile) have a negative opinion of democracy as opposed to 14% of those living in the richest 25% of the neighbourhoods. In the most deprived neighbourhoods (the districts in the first decile of average

income), 30% of the inhabitants displayed a distrust of democracy, which is twice the proportion observed on average in the population as a whole.

An analysis of the correlations between individual variables and political attitudes finds that, for virtually all the categories of variables considered, the percentage of people not in favour of democracy in the poorest neighbourhoods is systematically higher than the average percentage for the category considered (Table 4).

However, certain individual characteristics seem to "protect" individuals from this "territorial pressure" on individual opinions whereas others trigger an "antidemocratic overreaction". The rate of distrust among the richest individuals, those regularly practising a religion, the over-35s, and divorcees, widows and widowers remains relatively stable regardless of the neighbourhood of residence. However, workers in the formal sector and 25-34 year olds are much more wary of democracy when they live in an underprivileged neighbourhood (45% and 58% respectively say that they are not in favour of democracy, as opposed to 13% and 24% in the rich neighbourhoods).

Individual opinions in the poorest neighbourhoods are also highly sensitive to experiences and social trajectories. The probability of residents of a poor neighbourhood saying that they distrust democracy is raised all the more when they have been homeless at least once or have been under threat of eviction from their home.

Table 4: Distrust of democracy by neighbourhood type and individuals' social characteristics

	Total	Type of neighbourhood (average income per C.U.)					
		1st decile	1st quintile	1st quart	2nd quartile	3rd quartile	4th quartile
Age							
18-24	**13**	26	18	16	14	11	11
25-34	**21**	58	38	33	13	12	24
35-99	**16**	18	19	16	17	19	11
Gender							
Men	**14**	23	20	17	14	12	13
Women	**19**	35	27	23	17	20	14
Household income per C.U.							
50% poorest	**19**	32	25	23	16	19	14
50% richest	**14**	17	19	14	15	14	13
Qualifications							
BEPC (lower secondary school certificate) or below	**18**	33	25	22	16	16	14
Baccalauréat or +	**12**	-	4	4	11	14	14
Activity sector							
Formal public or private	**18**	45	33	27	15	15	13
Informal sector	**17**	23	19	17	19	17	18
Religion							
FJKM	**17**	26	19	17	18	18	14
Other Protestants	**17**	51	37	32	5	17	12
Others (including Catholics)	**17**	28	25	21	14	13	13
Religious practice							
Regular	**11**	9	10	9	10	13	14
Other	**20**	43	32	29	19	17	14
Homeless							
At least once	**22**	52	40	37	15	17	14
Never	**16**	27	22	19	7	6	10
Threat of eviction							
Once or more than once	**20**	42	32	29	14	22	14
Never	**16**	28	22	19	16	15	11
Total	**16**	**30**	**24**	**20**	**15**	**16**	**14**

Source: *1-2-3 Survey*, *Governance and Democracy* module, 2003, DIAL/INSTAT/MADIO. Authors' calculations.
Reading: 13% of the 18-24 year olds in the population as a whole are wary of democracy. 26% of the 18-24 year olds in the poor neighbourhoods in the first decile express this attitude.

Although the rejection of democracy is not the dominant opinion in the poor neighbourhoods, it is a frequent one. Madagascan history contains some elements compatible with this singular finding. In the country's political history, the poorest neighbourhoods have often been behind specific forms of mobilisation. During the 1972 unrest, the ZWAM[17], gangs of youths living off theft and in a permanent state of guerrilla warfare with the police, rallied to the insurrectionary movement. Yet although they have kept their organisation at neighbourhood level, they have nevertheless always been suspected of gratuitous violence (looting shops) and being manipulated by political activists from both sides (Althabe, 1978).

During D. Ratsiraka's second seven-year term of office (1983-1989), the population ministry enrolled the TTS[18], young unemployed people from the poor neighbourhoods, to terrorise the capital's urban population to prevent even the merest hint of a demonstration (Raison-Jourde, 1993). These practices raised their head again during the 2001 elections. D. Ratsiraka's supporters, for example, recruited the Bemiranga, young people from extremely poor families in the poor neighbourhoods rallied behind the singer Rossy, on the basis of their shared "Black" (*Mainty*) slave roots to create disturbances.

3   UNDERSTANDING THE DISTRUST OF DEMOCRACY IN THE POOR NEIGHBOURHOODS

3.1   Distrust of democracy: a territorial effect?

A sociologically pertinent approach to understanding the higher proportion of distrust of democracy in the poor neighbourhoods is to make the distinction between "composition" effects and "territorial" effects.

The more frequent expression of distrust of democracy in the poorest neighbourhoods could be partly due to their sociological composition. These neighbourhoods contain more people displaying some of the individual characteristics liable to generate a rejection of democracy. In the 10% poorest neighbourhoods, for example, the proportion of women and individuals without any qualifications is higher than in the other neighbourhoods and more individuals belong to nuclear households and have experienced unstable situations such as being homeless or never having held a steady job. Yet the higher proportion of these characteristics is not enough to explain the difference found between the neighbourhoods in terms of the rejection of democracy: given their composition, the expected rate of individuals distrustful of democracy in these neighbourhoods is barely over the average rate[19].

The neighbourhood effect would definitely appear to be a territorial effect. We take the above bivariate analysis further by introducing variables specific to the neighbourhood of residence (Table 5, Model B) into the previous logistic model (distrust of democracy) alongside the individual characteristics. The findings of this exercise confirm that the neighbourhood is a factor in marking individuals' political attitudes. Other things being equal, the fact of being born in the neighbourhood, of regularly or occasionally taking part in neighbourhood associations and the impression that there are some or a lot of drugs in the neighbourhood are significantly linked with the rejection of democracy. Likewise, the fact of living in a neighbourhood in the first income decile appears to be a significant variable in the distrust of democracy (Table 5, Model C). So the poor neighbourhoods would appear to "generate" a broad-based increase in antidemocratic feelings. It is therefore highly probable that the neighbourhood is a ground for the development of specific political attitudes.

It remains to be seen how the poor neighbourhoods can spark the development of specific political attitudes, which obviously assumes that the neighbourhood of residence, especially if it is deprived, has a specific identity, at least for those living there.

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[17]   *Zatovo Western Andevo Malagasy* (Young, Western – due to their identification with cowboys –, Slaves, Madagascan).
[18]   *Tanora Tonga Saina*. Literally, the young self-enlightened.
[19]   Yet, as we have seen, we have only been able to show a few specific variables that go towards explaining merely a small part of the differences in attitudes between individuals. This has prevented us from totally excluding the possibility that the particular concentration in the poor neighbourhoods of individuals with one or more specific "antidemocratic" characteristics (which may have escaped us) might explain this sizeable distrust of the democratic system.

3.2 The poor neighbourhoods: a space of socialisation

Note, first of all, that the inhabitants of these neighbourhoods are marked by shared and specific life experiences such as dealing with the insalubrity and overcrowding of their housing, uncertainty regarding the ownership of the space, a lack of infrastructure facilities, and underemployment. Many of these neighbourhoods are situated on (poorly) backfilled paddy-fields and were built several decades ago without any urban planning and without solving the question of land ownership. This has led to very unhealthy housing conditions (damp and risk of flooding) and major uncertainty over residential stability (threats of eviction when rehabilitation moves are made). Only 4% of the individuals in the poorest neighbourhoods have running water, meaning, for example, that they have to queue up at the nearest public water point several times a day. In these neighbourhoods, 48% of the workers (totalling 41% of the adults) are "self-employed", which means that due to the lack of jobs, they have to fend for themselves every day to find the wherewithal to feed their families.

The poorest neighbourhoods are also the centres of many social interactions (Wachsberger, 2006). Families are close here (over 80% of individuals have family members in the same neighbourhood). They are also conducive to friendships. Over 80% of the inhabitants state that they have friends in the neighbourhood and conversations with neighbours appear to be much more frequent in these districts than in the others. Furthermore, over 50% of their inhabitants spend their entire day in the neighbourhood, either because they work there (mainly in the informal sector) or because they are out of work.

Lastly, there are strong roots in the neighbourhood since 32% of adults are born there and the average length of residence is 22.9 years. We have shown just how important, subjectively speaking, poor neighbourhoods are to their inhabitants (Wachsberger, 2006). It is in these neighbourhoods that residents can find a minimum of protection and recognition, and receive vital moral support. Although this assistance is imperfect, it is especially important to the inhabitants given the failings of the other sources of assistance (especially the formal welfare system).

3.3 The formation of antidemocratic attitudes: aspirations and disappointments

O. Lewis, in his famous studies (1969, 1972), showed how a culture of poverty could develop that he defined as, "both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society." This culture is therefore essentially a form of adaptation to objective living conditions even though it tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation. It reflects, "an effort to cope with feelings of hopelessness and despair at the chances of succeeding on society's terms," (Lewis, 1969).

In Madagascar, however, poverty is a broadly shared social condition. In 2001, 70% of individuals were below the monetary poverty line. The poor are therefore far from being a marginal group. In such a configuration, called "integrated poverty" by S. Paugam (1996), the development of a culture of poverty as defined by O. Lewis does not seem very probable. However, the extent of the poverty is such that particular forms of exclusion and social relegation could well develop. Urban life is indeed conducive to such phenomena. In Antananarivo, for example, belying the supposed values of African solidarity, there are some 10,000 homeless people who are highly stigmatised as shown by the name of "4'mis"[20] by which they are usually known. A second, less visible, form of social disqualification could therefore arise from living in the poorest neighbourhoods. This is, in any case, a feeling frequently expressed by those living there.

The inhabitants of the poorest neighbourhoods feel more than the average that their neighbourhood has a bad or very bad reputation (44% as opposed to 32% on average). More especially, over one in five individuals (22%) said that they had been victims of discrimination in the past year due to their place of residence (as opposed to 3% on average). This feeling of being stigmatised is coupled with marked

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[20] Name given to them to define their supposed habits: *miady* (violence), *midaina* (drugs), *mitraina* (alcoholism) and *mivarotena* (prostitution).

pessimism about future prospects. A full 50% of the residents of poor neighbourhoods believe that their situation will remain the same or deteriorate in the coming year compared with an average of 32% for Antananarivians as a whole. This impression is also positively correlated with poor self-esteem. This self-esteem, the positive or negative opinion individuals have of themselves, is closely linked with the individual's social recognition. So low self-esteem is an important element in the process of social exclusion. As a consequence of social disqualification, it can further reduce the individual's capacity to reintegrate. Yet 38% of the inhabitants of the poorest neighbourhoods (but nearly three-quarters of those who said that they had been victims of discrimination due to their place of residence) have low self-esteem[21] (as opposed to 24% of individuals on average).

To test the hypothesis of social disqualification due to neighbourhood of residence, we added the variable "victim or not of discrimination due to place of residence in the past year" to the previous logistic model limited to the inhabitants of the poor neighbourhoods (Table 5, Model D). This suggests that having been a victim of such discrimination is the variable the most strongly and significantly associated with the rejection of democracy (alongside being born in the neighbourhood).

Antidemocratic attitudes could therefore well reflect this feeling of relegation and rejection. Recent rereadings of Tocqueville suggest that democracy has less to do with the reduction of real inequalities than with the "spread of an egalitarian representation of social relations" (Vidal, 2007), which extensively modifies individual behaviour. Democracy fuels new aspirations. Everyone can expect to become rich one day just as everyone can fear becoming poor. More importantly, everyone sees themselves as equals and this makes them particularly sensitive to "life's injustices" and a lack of recognition. In this context, situations of exclusion and relegation can fuel what Audier (2004) calls "egalitarian resentment". The "inequality of possibilities" (much more than real inequalities) generates disappointment and can extensively change attitudes to democracy[22]. The poor, segregated neighbourhoods could therefore well form a breeding ground for antidemocratic opinions.

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[21] Measured by the Rosenberg scale, 1965.
[22] What the press called riots in the French suburbs in November 2005 could well express this democratic resentment. We could also mention the slogan "death to democracy" written in red letters on the occupied EHESS (Higher College of Social Sciences). See also D. Goux and E. Maurin's analyses (2004b) of the 2004 regional elections in France.

Table 5: Factors associated with a distrust of democracy (logistic models)

	Model A		Model B		Model C		Model D*	
	Coeff.	Pr>Chi²	Coef.	Pr>Chi²	Coeff.	Pr>Chi²	Coef.	Pr>Chi²
Age								
18-24	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a	
25-34	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a	
35 and +	Ref		Ref		Ref		Ref	
Gender: Women	0.31	0.005	0.34	0.002	0.33	0.002	n/a	
Household income per C.U.								
First quartile	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a	
Second quartile	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a	
Other	Ref		Ref		Ref		Ref	
Qualifications								
No qualifications	0.24	0.098						
CEPE (elementary school-leaving certificate)	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a	
BEPC (lower secondary school certificate) or +	Ref		Ref		Ref		Ref	
Activity sector								
Public or semi-public	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a	
Formal private	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a	
Informal private	Ref		Ref		Ref		Ref	
Out of the labour force	-0.38	0.007	-0.37	0.010	-0.33	0.020		
Household type: Nuclear	0.25	0.019	0.24	0.032	0.24	0.032	n/a	
Ethnic group: Merina	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a	
Caste: Andriana	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a	
Religious practice: Regular	-0.48	0.000	-0.49	0.000	-0.50	0.000	-1.00	0.021
Experiences of instability								
Homeless: at least once in life	0.47	0.015	0.41	0.038	0.33	0.095		
Unemployed: at least once	0.28	0.011	0.24	0.028	0.24	0.029	n/a	
Job insecurity								
Always stable jobs	-0.37	0.004	-0.35	0.006	-0.33	0.009	n/a	
Insecurity following stability	n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a	
Stability following insecurity	-0.32	0.083	n/a		n/a		n/a	
Never stable or never worked	Ref		Ref		Ref		Ref	
Neighbourhood variables								
Place of birth								
Born in the neighbourhood			0.39	0.001	0.38	0.002	0.86	0.030
Participation in neighbourhood association								
Regular or occasional			0.22	0.034	0.21	0.048	0.71	0.080
Neighbourhood of residence								
First decile					0.50	0.005		
Victim of discrimination								
Discrimination due to neighbourhood							1.07	0.030
Number of observations	**2 801**		**2 801**		**2 801**		**229**	
R² adjusted	**0.05**		**0.06**		**0.06**		**0.24**	

Source: *1-2-3 Survey*, *Governance and Democracy* module, 2003, DIAL/INSTAT/MADIO. Authors' calculations.
*: Inhabitants of the neighbourhoods in the first decile of income per C.U.

3.4 Participation in neighbourhood associations: a citizenship commitment?

The poor neighbourhoods therefore delineate living and socialisation areas able to generate the development of a specific culture, of which the rejection of democracy can be one aspect. Neighbourhood associations appear to play a leading role in this mechanism. As we have already mentioned, taking part in neighbourhood associations is significantly and positively correlated with a distrust of democracy, regardless of the socio-demographic characteristics of the individuals concerned.

This correlation between participation in neighbourhood associations and distrust of democracy calls for a reconsideration of thinking on democratic citizenship. The work by R. Putnam (Putnam *et al.* 1994, Putnam 2000) on social capital has made it clear that associative participation, at least in the

Northern countries, is often presented as being a sign of citizenship. Putnum sees civicness as being tied up with a culture of co-operation, the main indicator of which is associative participation.

The *1-2-3 Survey* data show that associative participation is very frequent in Antananarivo. Overall, 51% of the capital's adults regularly or occasionally take part in family association activities, 47% in religious association activities, and 42% in neighbourhood association activities. Participation in neighbourhood associations is even more frequent in the poorest neighbourhoods, with over half of the adults in these districts stating that they participate. If family associations can *a priori* be excluded from the sphere of civil society, then religious associations and especially neighbourhood associations could well correspond to a form of collective commitment. Although the questionnaire makes no mention of the nature of these associations' activities, our field surveys show that many of them could be termed citizens' associations: associations of water hydrant users, collective paddy-field farming associations, youth associations organising leisure activities, neighbourhood watch associations, sports associations, etc.

In the poorest neighbourhoods, the different precarity and exclusion variables are positively correlated with participation in associations, especially the fact of having been homeless at least once. A total of 93% of individuals who have been homeless at least once take part in neighbourhood associations. Participation stands at 60% for those who have been unemployed for over six months and 63% for those who have experienced a downturn in job security. The individuals who are the most pessimistic about their economic prospects would also appear to be more frequently involved in these associations. Lastly, virtually all those who have suffered discrimination due to their place of residence (96%) take part in neighbourhood association activities. They represent 40% of these associations' members whereas they only account for 22% of the population of these neighbourhoods. Given these findings, associative participation could be seen as a form of political mobilisation, a tool in the struggle for existence, a way for disaffected individuals to take charge of their own lives, and a way to resist discrimination.

However, these associations are not necessarily civic-minded. As shown by E. Ritaine (2001), associative participation is "not limited to producing bridging capital, but can also produce bounded solidarity where the group closes in on itself and tends to exclude." The analysis of the correlations between the individual variables and participation in neighbourhood associations in poor neighbourhoods tends to validate this analysis. Associations in poor neighbourhoods do indeed tap the least socially integrated and most pessimistic about their future. Yet neighbourhood associations also seem to foster sectarianism as shown by the greater stated distrust of democracy and the more frequent ethnic identification of the individuals who participate in them.

CONCLUSION

There is massive support for democracy in Antananarivo and the poor do not appear to be less in favour of democracy than anyone else. This support for democracy therefore seems to suffer neither from the extreme poverty in the country nor from the level of inequalities, which has been on the rise in recent years. However, distrust of democracy combined with forms of mobilisation that could be deemed hostile to democracy appears to be fuelled by the most marked forms of social exclusion. The inhabitants of the poorest neighbourhoods, highly stigmatised by their poverty and their residence in a deprived neighbourhood, more frequently subject to various forms of insecurity, and also more often without hope and without prospects, much more frequently express antidemocratic attitudes, values and behaviour. Such attitudes could be fed by egalitarian resentment whose propagation is fostered by the importance of neighbourhood relations in the poorest neighbourhoods. Hence, the neighbourhood associations, far from promoting democratic values as is generally posited by studies on this subject, actually appear to uphold their rejection.

This study points to a certain number of avenues of research worth exploring more in depth. Firstly, although we have demonstrated the existence of a significant link between poor neighbourhoods and a distrust of democracy, the underlying reasons for this remain unknown, aside from the few elements of interpretation that we have proposed here. Secondly, the scope of this finding should be considered: is

it a Madagascan "exception", limited to Antananarivo and rooted in a singular history, or is it a more widespread phenomenon about which little information has hitherto been gathered? Lastly, in terms of urban policies, we find an additional argument in favour of programmes to promote the social balance. The formation and consolidation of "underclass" neighbourhoods represent a threat to the still-fragile democratisation processes.

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